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An innovative option contract for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of 
the Tagus-Segura Transfer in Spain 
Abstract 
The Tagus-Segura Transfer (TST), the largest water infrastructure in Spain, connects the 
Tagus basin’s headwaters and the Segura basin, one of the most water-stressed areas in 
Europe. The need to increase the minimum environmental flows in the Tagus River and to 
meet new urban demands has lead to the redefinition of the TST’s management rules, what 
will cause a reduction of transferable volumes to the Segura basin. After evaluating the 
effects of this change in the whole Tagus-Segura system, focusing on the availability of 
irrigation water in the Segura, the environmental flows in the Tagus and the economic 
impacts on both basins; we propose an innovative two-tranche option contract that could 
reduce the negative impacts of the modification of the Transfer’s management rule, and 
represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin water trading. We 
evaluate this contract with respect to spot and non-market scenarios. Results show that the 
proposed contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer’s management rule 
on water availability in the recipient area. 
Keywords: option contract, supply risks, Tagus-Segura Transfer, water markets 
1. Introduction 
One of the main objectives of water management is to deliver the required supply reliability 
levels and mitigate the social, economic and environmental consequences of droughts and 
floods. Water infrastructure and allocation rules mitigate climatic cycles but do not 
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completely eliminate supply risks. Spot water markets facilitate the efficient allocation of 
this resource and have some supply risk reduction properties, but do not provide efficient 
risk allocation mechanisms per se, which exploit differences in risk tolerance and exposure 
(Calatrava and Garrido 2006; Rey et al., 2016). 
  Although the legal basis for water trading was approved in 1999, formal water 
markets barely functioned in Spain until 2006, when inter-basin trading was authorised 
during drought periods. Trading experiences have been limited and the existing market 
system presents important shortcomings (Garrido et al., 2013; Rey et al., 2014). After 
legislative changes in 2013, inter-basin water trading is permanently allowed, not only 
during drought periods. Although inter-basin water markets still require the approval of the 
Spanish Government, this amendment will have important consequences due to the huge 
potential for inter-basin water exchanges. 
 Climate change projections show an important decrease in water availability for all 
Spanish River basins, especially in southern Spain (Garrote et al., 2015), with significant 
expected economic impacts (Maestre-Valero et al., 2013). In such context, water option 
contracts could add flexibility and security to users and suppliers’ operations (Kidson et al., 
2013). Options are one type of derivative contract that give the holder the right (not the 
obligation) to buy or sell the underlying asset (Cui and Schreider 2009; Cheng et al., 2011). 
These contracts do not imply the transfer of ownership and therefore, the right-holders 
retain control of the water allotment should the option not be exercised (Gómez-Ramos and 
Garrido 2004; Leroux and Crase 2010). In the Spanish water market, option contracts have 
not been used, but there have been a couple of experiences of multi-annual contracts that 
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resemble an option contract, and they have been extensively studied for the Spanish context 
(Gómez-Ramos and Garrido, 2004; Cubillo, 2010; Rey et al., 2016).  
The Tagus-Segura Transfer (TST), the largest water infrastructure in Spain, 
connects the Tagus basin’s headwaters and the Segura basin, one of the most water-stressed 
areas in Europe, covering a distance of more than 300 km. As water scarcity in the Tagus 
basin is becoming a serious concern, a change in the TST management rules has already 
been agreed upon (CHT 2013), in the sense of making it more restrictive in the provision of 
water resources to the Segura basin during dry periods.  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the resulting impacts of the change in the TST 
management rules and the potential of inter-basin trading as a mechanism to reduce these 
impacts on the Segura basin. Specifically, we propose a novel water option contract 
between users in the Tagus and the Segura basins and evaluate it with respect to previous 
spot market experiences. This innovative two-tranche option contract would: a) minimise 
the impact of the new TST management rules on irrigation water availability in the Segura 
basin, without affecting environmental flows in the Tagus River; and b) reduce risk, 
increase stability and security in inter-basin water exchanges for both parties.  
  The paper is organised as follows: first, we present the case study. Second, we 
define the main features of the proposed option contract and present the other considered 
scenarios (spot market and no market). The fourth section describes the data and modelling 
framework, while the fifth presents the impact of different scenarios on the irrigators’ water 
availability in the Segura basin and on the environmental flows in the Tagus River, together 
with the economic analysis.  
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2. Case study: The Tagus-Segura Transfer 
2.1. Tagus-Segura Transfer 
The Segura basin is the most water scarce basin in Spain with a structural water deficit of 
458 million m3/year (CHS 2014). Usually, this deficit is covered by non-renewable 
groundwater pumping and deficit water application to crops, frequently under water stress 
conditions (Calatrava and Martínez-Granados 2012). The TST was projected in the 1970s 
to reduce this deficit by transferring water resources from the Upper Tagus basin to 
irrigation districts (IDs) and urban water suppliers in the Segura basin (Figure 1), being 
approved by law in 1979. At this point, it is important to clarify that the ordinary water 
transfers using the TST do not result from market exchanges but from water rights allocated 
to users in the Segura. 
HERE FIGURE 1 
The annual transferred volume depends on the water stock jointly stored in the 
interconnected  Entrepeñas and Buendía reservoirs (E-B) in the Upper Tagus basin, with a 
storage capacity of 2,443 million m3. Prior to 1980 (when the TST started operating), the 
stock in E-B was above 1,500 million m3 for 70% of the months of the year (CHT 2011). 
Since 1980 the stored volume has experienced a sharp drop and the total volume hardly 
ever surpassed 1,500 million m3 (Figure 2). Fluctuations in the stored volume result in 
uncertainties about the annual volume to be transferred to the Segura basin. Designed to 
transfer 1,000 million m3/year, in practice much less water volumes have been transferred 
with large inter-annual variations (Martínez-Granados et al., 2011). Average annual 
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water transferred between 1979 and 2009 is 305 million m3 (205 for irrigation and 100 for 
domestic consumption). 
HERE FIGURE 2 
Water delivery to the Segura is based on certain transfer management rules that 
guarantee that the Tagus basin’s demands are always met. Twice a year, the Ministry of 
Environment announces the maximum volume that can be transferred to the Segura basin 
during the following semester, based on the volume stored in E-B (Table 1). The maximum 
annual legally transferable volume is 600 million m3, an amount that has rarely been 
reached since the Aqueduct was built. When the monthly water stock in E-B is below a 
minimum threshold (Level 3), the responsibility of deciding over the transfer operations 
shifts from the Tagus’s Basin Agency to the Council of Ministers. Therefore, there is some 
discretionary political power presiding over the inter-basin operations. 
HERE TABLE 1 
Since the beginning, some stakeholders from the Tagus basin have contested the 
TST operations (Hernandez-Mora and Del Moral, 2015). Their argument is that there is no 
water surplus in the basin, so water should remain there for the different economic 
activities, to meet urban demands and to maintain a good ecological status of the Tagus 
River. This opposition grows stronger during drought periods. 
2.2. Water availability risk in the Segura basin 
Farmers in the Segura basin that receive water from the Tagus basin face important risks 
due to water supply variability. In addition, when the transferred volume is low, irrigators’ 
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water volumes are the most affected as urban users have legal priority over irrigation 
(Figure 2).  
The reduced water volumes transferred during drought periods forced water users in 
the Segura basin to draw on the water market to obtain enough resources for their activity. 
In 2005, the extreme drought situation in the Segura basin lead the Ministry of the 
Environment to authorize inter-basin trading using the TST infrastructure, an exceptional 
situation that lasted until 2009 (Garrido et al., 2013). Two major trading experiences took 
place during that period between IDs in the Tagus basin (sellers) and IDs and urban 
suppliers in the Segura basin (buyers, all of them beneficiaries of the TST) (Calatrava and 
Gómez-Ramos 2009; Hernandez-Mora and Del Moral, 2015).  
First, the MCT, the major urban water supplier in the Segura basin, signed three 
consecutive annual agreements with farmers in the Canal de las Aves ID to transfer a total 
of 108,5 million m3 during 2006, 2007 and 2008 at an average price of 0.28 €/m3. Second 
the SCRATS (an association representing all IDs served by the TST) signed a contract, 
renewed during four years, with the Canal de Estremera ID in the Tagus basin to transfer 
31.05 million m3/year at an average price of 0.186 €/m3(prices are paid in origin and do not 
include transportation costs). 
 As these parties had already arranged water exchanges in four consecutive years, we 
conjecture that they might be interested in signing a water option contract under the new 
legislation (in which inter-basin trading is not restricted to drought periods) due to the 
institutional stability it would provide.  
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2.3. Water productivity values 
Considerable differences in water productivity between the selling and the buying areas to 
cover the transaction, transportation and environmental costs are crucial for water trading to 
take place. This is the case between the Tagus and Segura basins. For instance, the apparent 
productivity of irrigation water in Madrid (Tagus basin) is 0.6 €/m3, while in Murcia 
(Segura basin) it is 3.4 €/m3 (Gil et al. 2009). Similarly, the value of water presents 
significant differences. In the Tagus basin, the average and marginal values of water are 
0.06 €/m3 and 0.29 €/m3, respectively (Calatrava 2007); whereas in the irrigated areas 
served by the TST the average and marginal values of water are 0.69 €/m3 and 0.95 €/m3, 
respectively1 (Calatrava and Martínez-Granados 2012). Such difference favours the 
arrangements of inter-basin water exchanges. 
3. Scenario description 
The scenarios considered in our analysis result from the combination of both the 
traditional and new TST management rules and different water trading alternatives, 
resulting in 5 different scenarios: 
 Scenario 1a: traditional TST management rule without water trading; 
 Scenario 1b: traditional TST management rule with spot water purchases in drought 
periods; 
 Scenario 2a: new TST management rules without water trading; 
                                                          
1 The high water values in the Segura are, in part, due to the concentration of horticultural crops and 
greenhouses, and also to the widespread modernization of irrigation systems (Calatrava and Martínez-
Granados 2012). The agricultural sector that depends on the transferred volumes from the Tagus basin 
generates 1268 € million to the GDP of the Segura basin (PwC 2013). The cancellation of the TST would lead 
to a reduction of the GDP close to 7.1% (Sancho 2008). 
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 Scenario 2b: new TST management rule with spot water purchases in drought 
periods; 
 Scenario 2c: new TST management rule with the proposed option contract (different 
parameterizations). 
3.1. Tagus-Segura Transfer management rules 
The traditional management rule of the TST can be conceptually defined as:  
                                             (1) 
is the annual transferred volume (in million m3) to the Segura basin and  is a 
stochastic function of the water storage on January 1st in E-B reservoirs. Function  has 
been statistically fitted using records of TST operations from the three previous decades.  
We also define the new management rule as , which is similarly shaped 
to  but with different parameters, resulting in different probability density functions for 
and . This is a mathematical representation of the agreement reached in 2013 to 
change the TST management rule. 
3.2. Water market scenarios 
We define two different water market scenarios: a spot market, similar to the inter-basin 
trading activity that took place between 2005 and 2008, and the proposed water option 
contract.  
The water volume exchanged through the spot market is modelled as follows: 
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                                            (2) 
is the stochastic purchased volume if the hydrological conditions prevailing 
during the 2005-2008 drought period are met2, which occurs with probability p;  is a 
binomial distribution (0,1) and  is equivalent to 31.05 million m3 (the annual volume 
purchased by irrigators in the Segura basin during the 2005-2008 drought period). Although 
there are not sufficient observations to fit a binomial distribution, we assume that if spot 
trading activity took place under some circumstances in the past it will also occur in the 
future under the same conditions. 
The other market scenario is the water option contract. We propose an original 
multi-annual option contract, which would provide institutional stability and security and 
thus would be potentially interesting for both basins. The agreement is multiannual but the 
decision to acquire the water should be annual. It is modelled as follows:  
                                 (3) 
 is the water volume purchased through the option contract;  is a binomial 
variable (0,1);   is the stochastic accumulated inflows during the first five months of 
the year in E-B; and  is a function that yields the proportion of  that can be 
purchased under this scheme.  
The proposed option contract has two different components with different purposes. 
The first tranche is intended to protect Segura’s irrigators when the stock level in E-B is 
                                                          
 
2 Water stock in the E-B reservoir < 550 million m3.  
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low by purchasing water from the Tagus through the TST. The second tranche would allow 
irrigators in the Segura basin to have access to more water when the stock level in the E-B 
reservoirs is high, as a compensation for the change in the TST management rules. 
Each tranche has a different water seller involved. The first one ( = 1) represents a 
contract between irrigators in the Segura basin (buyer) and irrigators in the Tagus basin 
(seller). The trigger associated to this part of the contract would be a minimum stock level 
in E-B. Therefore, when the stock level is below this limit, irrigators in the Segura can 
purchase the corresponding water volume. Based on previous exchanges between these 
parties, we assume that the maximum volume that they would have access to with this part 
of the agreement is 31.05 million m3. This part of the contract intends to integrate past spot 
market experiences in a more reliable and secure system. 
The second tranche (  = 0) represents an agreement between irrigators in the Segura 
basin and the Tagus Basin Agency and could only be accessed when the water stock in E-B 
is higher than the established trigger, allowing the buyer to purchase a proportion  of the 
accumulated water inflows in the reservoir between January and May. 
4. Empirical model and parameterization 
Three different issues have been analyzed for each scenario: i) irrigators’ water availability 
in the Segura basin (referring only to resources from the Tagus basin); ii) remaining stock 
in the Tagus basin headwaters reserves; and iii) economic impact on the whole Tagus-
Segura system. Using Monte-Carlo simulation techniques we have obtained the probability 
distribution functions (PDFs) of these three variables for each scenario. By comparing these 
PDFs, we can compare the impacts of the TST management rules and the different water 
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trading mechanisms on water availability and on the economic performance of the whole 
system. 
4.1. Water availability for irrigators in the Segura basin 
4.1.1. Volumes transferred under each management rule 
For the definition of water availability under the traditional rule (previously explained in 
section 3.1), a regression model describing the annual transferred volume  has been 
fitted. This variable cannot be treated as stochastic due to the existence of the TST’s 
management rule (Table 1). A regression has been performed following this expression: 
                             (4) 
: Annual volume transferred to the Segura basin (million m3); : Water stock at the 
beginning of the year in E-B (million m3); : Dummy variable (0 when the stock in 
January is below 1000 million m3; 1 otherwise); : Number of the year in the database 
(1,...,20); : Error term ( ). We have added a time variable ( ) in both linear 
and quadratic terms because in previous and simpler specifications of the fitted model we 
observed that the error terms followed a quadratic pattern over time.  
HERE TABLE 2 
There are significant pressures to increase the minimum river flow, measured in 
Talavera de la Reina (downstream of Madrid, Tagus Basin), and currently set at 6 m3/s 
(CHT 2013). To achieve this, a higher stock level (‘remaining stock’) in E-B is required. 
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We simulate a change from the traditional management rule, , to the new management 
rule, , that would allow maintaining higher water stocks in E-B. From the estimated 
function  (Table 2), we derive function , which has different curvature and 
parameters and is more restrictive in terms of the minimum stock level in E-B required to 
transfer a certain amount of water. The new TST management rule is thus as follows: 
           (5) 
In Figure 3, both management rules are depicted. The transferred volumes under the 
new rule would be lower when the stock in E-B is low. Neither the new nor the traditional 
rule permit transferred volumes greater than 600 million m3 (400 million m3 for irrigation).  
HERE FIGURE 3 
The water volume available for irrigators in the Segura basin under these scenarios 
(1a and 2a) would be: 
 or                   (6) 
depending on whether the traditional or the proposed alternative management rule prevails.  
4.1.2. Water availability with spot purchases 
This scenario has been defined based on the water trading activity that took place during 
the previous drought period (see section 2.2), as follows: 
                                             (7) 
  
13 
 
 represents irrigators’ water availability from the TST in the Segura basin;  is 
the water transferred through the TST;  is a binomial variable that takes the value 0 when 
the stock in E-B is higher than 550 million m3 and 1 otherwise.  is the purchased volume 
(always 31.05 million m3).  
4.1.3. Water availability with the option contract 
The proposed option contract is defined as follows: 
                          (8) 
 is the annual transferred volume based on the new TST management rule;  is a 
binomial variable (equals to 1 when the stock level in E-B is below 550 million m3; zero 
otherwise).  is the transformation function that defines the proportion of the increase 
of water inflows in the E-B reservoirs  between January and May3, to which the 
option holder would have access to when the stock in E-B is higher than 550 million m3.  
The contract is designed to protect irrigators’ water availability in the Segura basin 
from the impacts of the change in the TST management rules. As this change attempts to 
improve the ecological status of the Tagus River, the option contract should not reduce its 
river flow. Therefore, when the stock level in the E-B is below 550 million m3, the buyer 
only has access to the first part of the contract (31.05 million m3). As this part of the 
agreement is between irrigators in each basin, it would not entail extra water consumption 
                                                          
 3 The inflows during these months are taken into account for the option contract model as the buyer has to 
decide whether to purchase the water or not at the end of May. 
  
14 
 
and the positive impacts of the new management rule on environmental flows would not be 
impaired by this water transaction.  
When the stock level is higher than 550 million m3, the second part of the contract 
would allow the buyer to access to a proportion of the accumulated inflows in the reservoir 
during the first five months of the year. If the option holder buys that water volume, the 
final stock in E-B will be reduced, as it is an extra consumption of water. However, with 
the change in the management rule, environmental flows will be guaranteed. This second 
part of the agreement would act as compensation to the TST beneficiaries for the change in 
the Transfer management rule. 
 Function takes different values depending on the total volume stored in E-B 
at the beginning of the year ( ) and on water inflows between January and May ( ). Some 
 will be more restrictive in the proportion of the water inflows that the buyer could 
purchase. Different versions of this scheme could be proposed and analysed simply by 
changing these proportions. Higher proportions benefit the buyer but reduce storage levels 
in the E-B reservoirs. As an example, we have selected three different levels (H1, H2, H3) 
of , in order to evaluate their impact on the studied variables. 
HERE TABLE 3 
 For the analysis of irrigators’ water availability in the Segura basin (taking into 
account only water resources from the Tagus basin), the following data have been 
collected: monthly water inflows and stored volumes in E-B (1958-2011, in million m3), 
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monthly transferred volumes to the Segura basin (1987-2011) and monthly water 
consumption from the TST by irrigators and municipalities (2000-2010). 
 
4.2. Water availability in the Tagus basin 
The following expression illustrates the effect of each scenario on the water stock level in 
the E-B reservoir and therefore, the volume that determines the Tagus River water flow: 
                                              (9) 
is the stock in E-B on December 31st; is the stock at the beginning of the 
year4;  represents the annual water inflows during the year5;  is the transferred 
volume for irrigators in the Segura basin for each scenario;  is the annual transferred 
volume to urban suppliers in the Segura basin6. The remaining stock ( ) is meant to meet 
all water demands in the Tagus basin, including maintaining environmental flows. The 
larger the remaining volume is, the larger the river flows that can be granted will be. 
4.3. Economic valuation 
To estimate the economic impact of the proposed scenarios, we have estimated the 
economic value of transferred/sold water from the Tagus to the Segura basin and defined 
                                                          
4  : Discrete function fitted using historical data (1991-2010). 
5  : Follows an Inverse Gauss pdf (p value: 0.6444). Distribution function fitted using historical data 
(1991-2010) 
6 : Follows an extreme value pdf (p value: 0.7358). Distribution function fitted using historical data (1987-
2010). 
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the positive and negative economic factors for each basin in scenario (Table 4). Their 
unitary values have been obtained from the existing literature in Spain. The Tagus basin 
receives the transfer fees (net of transportation costs) for the water transferred to the 
Segura, as a legal compensation to the areas-of-origin. On the other hand, the Tagus basin 
would incur in several opportunity costs related to that transferred (or sold) volumes, as a 
consequence of non-generated hydropower, foregone farm profit and environmental 
impacts. It is important to clarify that only those transferred volumes that come from ID 
water allotments (i.e., spot purchases and the first tranche of the option contract) result in 
an economic loss for the Tagus basin, as they would have been used for irrigation in the 
areas-of-origin. This economic impact has an associated multiplier effect that is also 
accounted for. In the recipient area, the transferred water volume would have a positive 
impact, including a multiplier effect on its economy. On the contrary, they have to pay the 
agreed price for each water source. 
HERE TABLE 4 
For the Tagus basin, the economic opportunity cost for each scenario has been 
calculated using water value curves obtained from a non-linear mathematical programming 
model, developed by Calatrava (2007) for the Tagus River Basin Authority, that simulates 
the economic use of irrigation water. The economic value of the transferred/sold water to 
the Segura basin has been computed using a non-linear mathematical programming model 
that simulates the economic use of water for irrigation in the basin (Martínez-Granados et 
al. 2011; Calatrava and Martínez-Granados 2012). 
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For each scenario, the net benefit from the transferred/sold water volumes in the 
whole Tagus-Segura system has been calculated, taking into account all the above-
mentioned positive and negative factors in each basin, as follows:  
          (10) 
 are the benefits derived from the transferred volume; are the total costs; is the 
water volume transferred/sold to irrigators in the Segura basin under scenario . Obviously, 
a water transfer to another basin may have a negative impact on the area-of-origin. 
However, if the positive impact of this water transfer on the recipient area is higher, the 
overall welfare will be improved. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Water availability under the different scenarios  
During the last decade, irrigators in the Segura basin have relied on water markets to reduce 
the risk of not getting enough water from the Tagus basin (see Section 2.2). Figure 4 
represents the effect of this market activity on irrigators’ water availability in the Segura 
basin. The spot market reduces the risk on the left side of the distribution, allowing 
irrigators to get more water during drought periods. 
HERE FIGURE 4 
Under the new TST management rule (Eq.5), the transferred water volume for 
irrigators in the Segura basin would be reduced. Figure 5 shows this reduction if the 
management rule changes to a more restrictive one (from line 1a to line 2a). 
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The proposed option contract offers a mechanism for offsetting this negative impact 
on water availability. With the first part of the contract, which entitles them to purchase 
water when the stock in E-B is low, this reduction is compensated. With the second part, 
based on , they have access to more water as E-B stock grows. Depending on the 
proportion of the accumulated inflows that irrigators in the Segura basin have access to 
(H1, H2, H3), the impact of the change of the TST management rule would be reduced in a 
different magnitude. Scenario 2c would represent an improvement with respect to the water 
availability under the traditional rule, increasing the probability of obtaining 400 million m3 
from the Tagus basin (from 3.7% to 9% for H3). 
HERE FIGURE 5 
The probability of not receiving any water from the Tagus basin increases under the 
new management rule, as more stock in E-B is required to transfer a certain amount of 
water. Therefore, irrigators in the Segura basin would receive less water when the stock 
level in E-B is low, allowing for a better and faster recovery of the water stock in the Upper 
Tagus basin. In these years, they could have access to the first part of the option contract 
and purchase 31.05 million m3 from an ID in the Tagus basin. When the stock in E-B is 
low, irrigators in the Segura basin would have access to the same water volume both with 
spot purchases and with the option contract, which is why the values of p5 and p10 are the 
same for both cases (see Table 5). 
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5.2. Remaining stock in E-B reservoir 
Another important aspect of the proposed contract is its effect on the remaining water stock 
in E-B (Figure 6), and consequently on the environmental flows in the Tagus River. With 
the new management rule, that reduces the transferred volumes, the available stock in E-B 
would be higher, allowing the increase of environmental flows in the middle Tagus.  
HERE FIGURE 6 
The remaining stock in dry years (lower percentiles’ values) is higher under the new rule 
with the option contract (even for H3) than under the traditional management rule. For 
higher percentiles, the stock differences are very small in relative terms (Table 5).  
With the new management rule and the option contract, the left tail of the PDF of the 
stock in E-B is higher (close to 50 million m3 higher in percentile 1%), improving the 
hydrological status of the reservoir in critical years and allowing the maintenance of 
environmental flows. However, with the proposed scheme, in years when the stock in E-B 
is high, the holder could benefit from this situation, having access to a greater water 
volume. 
5.3. Economic analysis 
The economic value of the impacts identified for each basin and considered 
scenarios (see section 4.3), has been calculated for the whole Tagus-Segura system, taking 
into account the water volumes transferred to irrigators in the Segura basin under each 
scenario. Figure 7 shows the PDFs of the economic value for the whole system 
(considering both basins). 
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HERE FIGURE 7 
As shown in Figure 7, the Tagus-Segura Transfer generates important net economic 
benefits, mainly due to high-productive agriculture of the recipient area. A change in the 
TST management rules will lead to a negative impact in this Tagus-Segura system, which 
has been estimated on average at nearly €200 million. Both the spot purchases scenario and 
the option contract scenario reduce this negative impact. Moreover, results clearly show 
that the proposed option contract would be more beneficial for the Tagus-Segura system 
than a spot water market such as the currently existing one. 
For P65 and higher percentiles (Table 5), the net benefit values from the option 
contract (H1) under the new management rule are slightly higher than the ones obtained for 
the traditional rule scenario. If higher H values of the option contract are considered, the net 
benefit under this scenario would be even higher than the ones obtained under the 
traditional management rule. 
HERE TABLE 5 
6. Conclusions 
Water users in Mediterranean regions suffer considerable water supply risks. The Tagus-
Segura Transfer has alleviated water scarcity in the Segura basin, but its water deliveries 
have economic and environmental effects in both the recipient basin and the area-of-origin. 
It operates under a management rule that depends on stochastic hydrological variables, but 
also on political discretionary decisions. 
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Either because of the need to increase minimum environmental flows in the Middle 
Tagus or because of reduced run-off caused by climate change, or both, a redefinition of the 
management rules governing the TST had to be implemented. This change implies a 
reduction in the transferable volumes, especially in dry periods.  
A water option contract similar to the one proposed here would reduce the negative 
impacts of the change in the management rule on both water availability and risk exposure 
of the transfer’s beneficiaries. When the stock level in E-B is high, the option contract 
would allow irrigators in the Segura basin to access to even more water than with the 
traditional rule. When transferred water volumes are reduced, users in the Segura could rely 
on the first tranche of the contract and on other more costly but also more secure water 
sources, such as desalination.  
The change in the management rule would increase the currently low environmental 
flows in the Tagus basin and meet the increasing demands. With the proposed option 
contract both objectives could be met, striking a more balanced equilibrium between 
environmental and irrigators’ interests. Parameters in function , that determine the 
proportion of the water inflows that the buyer has access to, should be carefully chosen in 
order to meet these goals. In this paper, we have modelled three different H levels, 
somewhat arbitrarily set, to meet the general option contract requirement: acceptability by 
both sellers and buyers and by the Tagus basin’s stakeholders.  
The TST has an enormous importance for the economy in the recipient area, one of 
the most productive agricultural regions in Spain. A 10% reduction in transferred water 
volumes would cause a 1% reduction in the Segura basin’s agricultural production in the 
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short term and a 4% reduction in the long term (PwC, 2013). As our results show, a change 
in the TST management rule would have considerable economic impacts for the Tagus-
Segura system, what should be taken into account when deciding the future of the most 
important water transfer in Spain.  
As domestic uses have priority over irrigation, urban suppliers in the Segura basin 
face a smaller risk. However, as they depend on the resources from the TST, they are also 
affected when the transferred water is not sufficient to cover urban demands. Therefore, a 
water option contract like the one proposed here could be useful for them. 
The restriction of inter-basin trading activity to drought periods did not encourage 
the development of more stable and sophisticated trading mechanisms. Under the new 
legislation, in which inter-basin trading can be authorised in all circumstances, option 
contracts could provide stability to both parties. 
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Fig. 1 Location of the Tagus and Segura basins and the Tagus-Segura Aqueduct. Source: 
Adapted from www.iagua.es 
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Fig. 2 Annual stored volume in Entrepeñas-Buendía (blue line, right axis) and volumes 
transferred for irrigators and urban suppliers through the Tagus-Segura Transfer, 1979-
2011(million m3, left axis). Source: (CHT 2011) and San Martín 
(2011)
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Fig. 3 Traditional and new management rules for the Tagus-Segura Transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
Fig. 4 Cumulative probability curves representing the water availability (million m3) for 
irrigators in the Segura basin 
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Fig. 5 Cumulative probability curves representing the water availability (million m3) for 
irrigators in the Segura basin 
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Fig. 6 Cumulative ascending curves of the PDFs of the remaining stock (Se) in E-B  
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Fig. 7 Cumulative ascending curves of PDFs of the net benefit (billion €) derived from the 
Tagus-Segura water transfers 
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Table 1. Tagus-Segura Transfer’s statutory management rules. Source: CHT (2008) 
LEVEL RESERVOIR STATUS 
MONTHLY 
MAXIMUM 
TRANSFERABLE 
VOLUME 
 (million m3) 
1  
Accumulated water inflows during the last 12 months 
higher than 1000 million m3, or stored volume above 
1500 million m3. 
68 
2 
Accumulated inflows during the last 12 months 
smaller than 1000 million m3, or tstored volume 
below 1500 million m3. 
38 
3 (Exceptional 
hydrological situation) 
Stored water volume lower than the volumes in Table 
2 
23 
4a (No water surplus) Stored volume below 240 million m3. 0 
a The new Tagus-Segura management rule is more restrictive. It considers there is no water surplus in the 
Tagus Basin when the stored volume is below 400 million m3, rather than 240. 
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Table 2. Estimated regression model for the variable “annual transferred volume to 
irrigators” under the traditional TST management rule 
 Coefficient Standard error t value p value 
  (intercept) -150.414 60.9494 -2.47 0.025 
  (Stock)  0.549 0.0592 9.27 0.000 
  D (Stock > 1000) -245.014 46.7163 -5.24 0.000 
  (Year) 26.729 10.5895 2.52 0.023 
Year^2) -0.919 0.3766 -2.44 0.027 
Number of obs. 20 (1991-2010)    
F (4,16) 40.08 R2 0.909  
Prob > F 0.000 Adj. R2 0.887  
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Table 3. Considered values of the  coefficient 
 Minimum storage condition (i)  Accumulated inflows (j)  
 St<550 550≤St<800 800≤St≤950 St>950  <350 350≤ ≤650 >650 
H 
interval 
H1 0 0.03 0.04 0.05 + 0.02a 0.03a 0.04a 0-0.09 
H2 0 0.04 0.06 0.07 + 0.02a 0.03a 0.05a 0-0.12 
H3 0 0.05 0.07 0.09 + 0.02a 0.04a 0.06a 0-0.15 
a 0 if St < 550. Thus, if the stock level is below this threshold, the option holder cannot get any water volume 
through this part of the contract. 
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Table 4. Values of the positive and negative economic factors considered for each basin 
and scenario 
  
Concept 
Scenarios 
  
1a. 
Traditional 
transfer rule 
(no market) 
2a. New 
transfer rule 
(no market) 
2b. New 
transfer rule 
(spot 
market) 
2c. New 
transfer rule 
(option 
contract) 
Data Source 
Tagus 
basin 
Positive 
factors 
Transfer fees 
(compensation to 
Tagus areas) 
0.03 €/m3 0.03 €/m3 0.03 €/m3 0.03 €/m3 
Calatrava and 
Martinez-
Granados (2012) 
Spot price - - 0.09 €/m3 - 
Garrido et al. 
(2013) 
Option contract fee - - - 0.06 €/m3 - 
Negative 
factors 
 
Opportunity costs 
(hydropower) 
0.093 €/ m3 0.093 €/ m3 0.093 €/ m3 0.093 €/ m3 
Hardy and Garrido 
(2010) 
Opportunity costs 
(environmental) 
0.0244 €/m3 0.0244 €/m3 0.0244 €/m3 0.0244 €/m3 
Elorrieta et al. 
(2003) 
Opportunity costs 
(economic) 
- - 
Tagus 
model 
Tagus 
model 
Calatrava (2007) 
Economic 
multiplier effect 
- - 
0.315 €/€ of 
product 
0.315 €/€ of 
product 
MMA (2000) 
Seguraa 
Positive 
factors 
Farm profit 
Segura 
model 
Segura 
model 
Segura 
model 
Segura 
model 
Martínez-
Granados et al. 
(2011) 
Economic 
multiplier effect 
1.206 €/€ of 
product 
1.206 €/€ of 
product 
1.2                               
06 €/€ of 
product 
1.206 €/€ of 
product 
PwC 2013) 
Negative 
factors 
Transfer fees 0.125 €/m3 0.125 €/m3 0.125 €/m3 0.125 €/m3 
Garrido et al. 
(2013) 
Spot price - - 0.21 €/m3 - 
Garrido et al. 
(2013) 
Option contract fee - - - 0.21 €/m3 - 
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Table 5. Percentiles’ value of the water availability (million m3), remaining stock in E-B 
(million m3) and net benefit (€ million). 
 Scenario P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P65 P75 P95 
Water 
availability 
in the 
Segura 
Basin  
(million m3)  
1a 0.00 6.34 35.50 105.74 222.14 274.01 309.42 398.08 
2a 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.41 163.76 231.67 269.83 371.99 
2b 0.00 31.05 31.05 31.05 165.03 230.46 270.26 372.22 
2c (H1) 23.46 31.05 31.05 37.46 194.68 262.71 303.16 400.00 
2c (H2) 29.41 31.05 31.05 41.26 204.07 271.10 313.88 400.00 
2c (H3) 31.05 31.05 31.05 43.09 213.83 281.77 325.05 400.00 
Remaining 
stock in 
E-B 
(million m3) 
1a 577.00 693.97 764.28 907.02 1139.39 1295.62 1407.54 1778.93 
2a 628.81 736.85 814.68 986.10 1198.69 1336.03 1441.40 1787.92 
2c (H1) 627.73 721.81 801.36 963.07 1175.90 1314.33 1417.11 1758.97 
2c (H2) 626.33 717.55 796.09 954.77 1168.18 1306.83 1410.41 1751.25 
2c (H3) 624.30 715.07 792.40 947.31 1161.70 1301.37 1404.75 1742.50 
Net benefit 
(€ million) 
1a 6.00 50.81 180.29 514.61 1056.32 1290.36 1447.08 1809.58 
2a 2.00 2.00 2.00 27.70 797.67 1092.59 1278.04 1697.70 
2b 10.00 140.05 141.93 141.93 795.63 1089.64 1275.39 1698.40 
2c (H1) 114.34 140.86 140.86 189.09 935.36 1245.60 1426.05 1840.93 
1a: traditional rule (no market); 2a: new rule (no maket); 2b: new rule (spot purchases); 2c: new rule (option 
contract). 
 
 
